Introduction
After the recent convulsions at social and political levels, the "Middle East" once again finds itself at the cusp of present uncertainties and future possibilities. The nomenclature "Middle East" has been a political expression rather than a geographical one; however, the discussion in this study relates to the region from the Indus to the Nile that is significant for its conflict-prone and energy-rich characteristics. It is still premature to completely assess the outcomes and impacts of the so-called "Arab Spring" uprisings and upheavals on the emerging geostrategic outlook in the Middle Eastern arena. Nonetheless, two and a half years after the upsurge began, it is useful to tentatively delineate and scrutinize the region's unfolding maturations. Future developments can only be forecasted. By studying the upheavals and their possible repercussions on the geostrategic environment. Considering the significance of religious, strategic, political, and economic ties between Pakistan and the Middle East, the study also discusses the impacts of power transitions in the Middle East on Pakistan. Given the rapid changes, demands for popular participation, and success of Islamist movements sweeping the Middle Eastern political realm, this study applies the power transition theory to the interplay of four countries in the Middle East, namely Iran, Turkey, Egypt, and Israel. It also addresses the pressing questions that relate to the interplay of these countries. For example, will Israel be more isolated than before in the region, and if so, why? Has Iran’s influence dwindled in the region, and have Iranian ideological, political, and economic tools dwindled as well? Will the containing and balancing efforts of the US and its allies in the region be enough to keep Iran lonely? How do Turkey and Egypt, both non-Arab states, factor into this equation? And, how does the interplay of these players affect the region? The main argument of this study is that the interplay between Iran, Turkey, Israel, and Egypt is transforming the region. All of these Middle Eastern players carry important strategic assets in this interplay: Iran, an energy-rich Gulf power, has a nuclear card in hand; Turkey is a rising Euro-Asian power with NATO membership and has a booming economy; Egypt is considered a trendsetter and leader in the Arab World, plus its demographic and geographic disposition make it significant; Israel is militarily strong, is the only nuclear power in the region and European and American interests also converge on the country.
The Middle East and the Transition of Power
In the paradigm of realism, there are many approaches to assessing the shift in the realm of international relations. However, this paper applies the "power transition" theory to study the interplay of power centers in the Middle East. Power transition theory is a structural and dynamic approach to world politics. According to A.F.K. Organski, "international systems are frequently dominated by a single powerful state that uses its strength to create a set of political and economic structures and norms of behavior that enhance both the security of the lead state and the stability of the system as a whole." The maintenance of the status quo is a determinate factor in satisfaction. A state that is satisfied with the status quo can ally with the dominant state and get economic and security aid, but other states that happen to be dissatisfied are usually too weak to alter the status quo. But, if a state grows in power, which is determined by the rate of industrialization, and is dissatisfied with the status quo, then that state will initiate a war to change the status quo. In the book, "Causes of War," Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson argue that "the rising challenger begins a war to hasten the transition and bring benefits from the international system into line with the challenger’s rising military power." The change from a bipolar world to a single dominant power is not the only reason why the world is so different. Theories that thrived on viewing the world through the clash of two superpowers no longer apply, and this has been a critical policy failure for lawmakers. Tammen attempts to rectify this failure in two ways: first, by providing "a composite picture of power transition theory by integrating the various extensions and amplifications into a coherent whole," and second, by translating power transition theory into policy-relevant terms. In power transition theory, war occurs because of three conditions: "power shifts, approximate equality of power, and dissatisfaction with the status quo". Unlike balance of power theory, which comes into opposition to power transition theory and solely focuses on the power of the military, power transition theory defines power as "the cumulus of population, economic productivity, and the political capacity of the state to mobilize resources to support international policies". In other words, the increasing industrialization of a state increases its power. But as Levy and Thompson argue, the growth of a state "follows an S-shaped growth curve." The power of the state grows the more it industrializes but eventually levels off as the state continues to sustain itself. That is why a possible challenger could catch up to the dominant state. Because the dominant state's growth is modest, a potential challenger quickly industrializes and can challenge the dominant state, but the challenger must be dissatisfied with the status quo once more. Considering the volatile state of peace in the Middle East and the center of two of the most dangerous conflicts, understanding the interaction of the structural and dynamic components of power transition theory provides a probabilistic tool by which to measure the changes in the region and forecast likely events in future rounds of change. While based on empirically tested propositions backed by large data sets, the theory has an intuitive feel that maximizes its utility for interpreting the interplay of the four emerging powers in the region. Before discussing the reasons for the emergence of new power centers, the study gives an overview of three major players that have been dominating regional politics.
An Overview of Old Power Centers in the Region
For decades, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq have been exercising an important influence in the Middle East. Beginning with Syrian, Egyptian, and Saudi Arabian bandwagoning in 1973 against Israel to recover the territories occupied in 1967; their collaboration on the 1989 Taif agreement that brought an end to the civil war in Lebanon; their assistance to the US war to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation; and the accord that underlies the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, Cairo, Riyadh, and Damascus have been able, at times, to effect major change in the Middle Eastern realm. But with the start of the twenty-first century, the regional dynamics have started changing and the old order is withering away. Syria's transition from being an influential player to being a playing field amongst regional and international players has been completed. Assad’s regime has proven too strong to be brought down quickly and too illegitimate to continue holding power in the country. Hence, Syria, in all probability, is entering a "lost decade" in which the collapse of the Assad regime will be followed by an uneasy transition. It will, therefore, take years to rebuild and regain political, security, and economic order in the country. Due to internal and external factors for almost two decades, Iraq has been absent from regional influence. " The American invasion of Iraq led to the eclipse of secular Al-Baathists and the abolition of the largest standing Arab army, ostensibly assuring greater security for Israel. However, this effectively meant the end of "Sunni-dominated" Iraq, which was seen as "strong and motivated enough to balance radical Shiite Iran."Although a new Shi’a-led state order is struggling to assert itself in Baghdad, it will not be easy for the war-prone and terrorism-infected country to re-emerge as a regional power. Saudi Arabia faces the medium-term challenge of adapting its political institutions to changing political expectations. That challenge is set to have important ramifications for Saudi Arabia’s future regional position. Here, it seems necessary to discuss the elements that were instrumental in the emergence of new power centers.
The Emergence of New Power Centers in the Middle East: The Instigating Elements The drivers of change in the Middle East may be viewed with a six-fold focus: 9-11 and the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan; the rise of non-state actors; the Arab Spring and the fall of authoritarian rules; the rise of Islamists against nationalists; declining U.S. and Western influence in the region; the weakening of erstwhile powers and the resultant vacuum in the region Firstly, after the 9-11 attacks on the US, President George W. Bush announced that "fighting terrorism and preventing future attacks would be his administration’s top priority". Governments were given an ultimatum to decide whether they stood with the United States in the war against terrorism or would face US wrath. In this regard, two operations, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, were launched, and the Taliban and Saddam governments were overthrown. Attacks in the US and resulting operations, perhaps, triggered the chain of events that would impact the whole region. The major benefactor of the two operations has ironically been Iran, whose wings the US wanted to clip.
Second, non-state actors have been strengthened in the region due to the successive failures of states in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the 9-11 attacks, and a lack of adequate participation in the decision-making process. According to Arif Kamal, "They have, in some cases, come up with enlarged roles compared with the role of a state. For example, Hezbollah’s resistance to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (July 2006) brought them to legendary status as this non-state actor was seen doing what all Arab regular armies had previously failed to do. Similarly, the rise of Hamas and its sustainability in the impoverished Gaza, in spite of its eclipse from power, is a point in the case. " These actors, such as Al-Qaidah in Iraq, have added another complexity to the region’s tense situation, further supporting the transformation of power.
Third, the "Arab Spring" can be defined as a crisis in central authority in which old orders in a sizable minority of states have proven untenable even as new and freer orders are struggling to emerge. In Tunisia and Egypt in 2011, internal mass protests forced the leadership to resign within weeks. Popular movements throughout the Middle East were bolstered by these successes, which were rooted in issues of governance, economic disparities, youth bulge, and full use of social media. They demanded substantial political reform and, in some cases, regime change. After decades of authoritarian rule and political stagnation, popular movements were finally able to destabilize or overthrow a number of authoritarian regimes in the Arab world. This phenomenon has transformed the political setup of the Middle Eastern countries, governed by decades-old dynastic rules.
Fourth, experts in Arab and Islamic affairs who have studied the 2011 Arab revolutions’ effects on both the Islamic and nationalist agendas have "noticed that the mood of the Arab populace everywhere seems to be dominated by Islamic rather than Arab sentiment". Some might claim that Islam is connected to Arab identity and that Arabism is rather an ingredient of the Islamic community’s make-up. Nevertheless, a careful review of Islamic political theory reveals that "in his writings, Imam Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood and its first spiritual leader, believed in the presence of harmony and symmetry between the Islamic and Arab viewpoints." The results of the so-called "Arab Spring" also seemed to prove the ‘Islamic revival’ in the region. How well Islamists are doing in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco are, however, debatable issues.
Fifth, the declining US influence in the Middle East is a long-term, secular process, probably ongoing for many years. It has had two major accelerators. One, the Iraq War, discredited the US and weakened militarily and morally its posture in the Arab world. Two, the Arab Spring is also a contributor to diminishing the US's erstwhile advantage. The US has less familiarity with the new actors in the region and an even less powerful position from which to influence those actors on the ground.
Sixth, internal clashes and external invasions have weakened Syria and Iraq, creating a power vacuum in the region. This void was filled by Iran and Turkey, both of which are strategically and economically powerful. Egypt, despite going through a transformation, retained its position as the Arab World's leader.
The New Power-Centers in the Middle East
Iran is a regional power thanks to three decades of social, economic, diplomatic, and military advancements. Iran has the world's second-largest gas and third-largest oil reservoirs. One of Iran's greatest successes is the dramatic expansion of its middle class. Despite declines in oil exports and tightened international sanctions, Iran ranked 18th worldwide by GDP (purchasing power parity adjusted) in 2012. Iran is also a formidable regional military power. However, for the last decade, its nuclear program has been a "game of hiding and seek, and claims and disclaims." The Turk government, what has come to be called a moderately Islamic government, has been in power for the last 10 years. Ideological reinterpretation of secular and traditional ideas, successful transfer of power from military to civilian elite, geo-strategic location, and economic boom have all contributed to Turkey's confident posture in dealings with the US and the West. Turkey has a booming economy, growing at a rate of 9-10 percent. Its average growth rate over the last ten years has been around 7%. Its income per capita has tripled, and its GDP has doubled. So it's not just a political success story; it's also an economic success story scripted and strengthened by capitalism, entrepreneurship, and internal political stability. In some ways, before the Arab Spring, Turkey was even a winner. Based on America's failure in Iraq and the absence of Arab leadership on the Palestinian issue, a vacuum in the Middle East was created. Turkey was successfully able to fill that vacuum with its strategic depth; Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu called this "zero problems with neighbors." Egypt’s demography and geographic disposition make it significant in the region and the world as well. It is the largest populated country in the Middle East and Africa with almost eighty-five million people. Egypt also has the largest army in Africa and the Middle East, with 450,000 personnel. Under Egyptian control, the Suez Canal and the Sumed pipeline are the most important means of transportation from the Indian Sea to the Mediterranean. Historically, Egypt was also politically strong. As Nasser saw it, with considerable justice, "Egypt was potentially at the center of three circles: the African, the Arab, and the Islamic". This geopolitical importance made it the object of interest to the great powers. Egypt’s new standing has already breathed new life into the Arab League and allowed it to succeed in mediating long-stalled intra-Palestinian negotiations. Even at this time, when Egypt is passing through another crisis in authority, its historic regional role, geographic disposition, and military strength afford it considerable clout in regional affairs. Israel has the strongest military and is the only nuclear power to the west of the Nile. Plus, Israel is significant to American interests and foreign policy in the region. Also, Israel, from a strategic standpoint, is imperative for western interests because it impedes what the scholar Fouad Ajami calls the "Dream Palace of the Arabs." In essence, it impedes both the pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism espoused by Nasser, Arafat, Saddam Hussein, and Bin-Laden and likeminded individuals. "Israel is a literal and figurative bulwark against a cross-continental Arabo-Muslim empire. It inhibits pan-totalitarianism in the forms of Arab nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism. " As a result of the Arab Spring, Israel lost its last friend in the region with the fall of the Mubarak regime in Egypt. And without Mubarak, King Abdullah of Jordan can no longer be counted on as a friend.
The Interplay of Power Centers and the Way Forward
As the biggest Arab country, with internal strife and political instability, Egypt's domestic policies, and especially its foreign orientations, may crucially impact the newly emerging geo-strategic posture of the Middle East. Morsi had apparently attempted to create a new strategic balance between the Suni-Muslim states, Shi'i Iran, and Israel, as well as among the USA, Russia, and China. According to Morsi, "international relations between all states are open and the basis for all relations is balance. We are not against anyone, but we are in favor of achieving our interests. Now, when Morsi is no more and the Brotherhood in Egypt is losing influence in the power corridors of the country, the future of Egypt remains dependent on the army's capability to hold an election and the Muslim Brotherhood’s potential to carve a place in the new government for themselves. Nevertheless, a compelling partnership for a strategic coalition in favor of Egypt is not Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates but primarily Turkey, since both Turkey and Egypt are regional powers with Sunni Islamic democratic systems. According to the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoglu, "a partnership between Turkey and Egypt could create a new democratic axis of power." To be sure, both Ankara and Cairo are not hostile to Iran, as is Saudi Arabia and most of the Gulf Emirates. The Turkish and Egyptian governments will also endeavor not to antagonize Iran unless their interests are in jeopardy. For example, one contentious issue between Turkey and Iran is Turkey's dependence on Iran's gas supply and its leverage over the PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party) through Iranian (and Syrian) Kurds. Nevertheless, Turkey and Egypt have a common interest and will probably coordinate their efforts to contain Tehran's attempts to create a "Shi'i Crescent" and control oil resources in the Gulf region. This strategy would certainly obtain full cooperation from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates, as well as the USA. Yet, both democratic Turkey and Egypt would be careful not to fully identify with the autocratic-monarchic-conservative Sunni-Muslim regimes, such as in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. They may even act as mediators between these Sunni regimes and Tehran. The most important and challenging is the crucial Israeli-Palestinian problem, namely Israel's stubborn refusal to allow Palestinian self-determination in the West Bank in the form of a state and its continued siege of the Gaza Strip. Due to Israel’s stubbornness, anti-Israeli manifestations, which had been largely curtailed by Mubarak's regime, erupted in Egypt once his regime collapsed and full freedom of expression had been granted. Obviously, these pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli sentiments have reflected the deeply-rooted ideology of the Muslim Brothers and of their leaders, who were elected to govern Egypt. In this regard, Muhammad Morsi, the detained President of Egypt, appealed to President Obama in late September 2012, asking him to help in settling the Palestinian issue in the form of an independent state. He argued that if Israel expects Egypt to respect its peace treaty with it, Israel should also implement its commitments regarding the Palestinians within this peace treaty. Aside from hinting that this treaty could be revised, Morsi did not cut diplomatic relations with Israel and even appointed a new Egyptian ambassador to Tel Aviv in early September 2012. Simultaneously, Egypt's new defense minister, Abd Ali Abd al-Ali Fath al-Sisi, coordinated with his Israeli counterpart, Ehud Barak, the dispatch of Egyptian armored and commando units to Sinai to fight Salafi and Jihadist elements. The military's lead takeover this July, following last year’s revolution, has unfolded wide cleavages in contemporary Egyptian society. On July 3, after the clashes for and against Morsi’s regime that started on June 28, the army ousted democratically elected President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood. The military has appointed Adly Mansour as interim President and declared a rather speedy timetable to amend the Constitution by deleting the offensive provisions, submitting it to a referendum, and holding presidential and parliamentary elections in six months. Despite the new government’s promises,
The fight for and against military actions continues on the street. Those opposing Brotherhood rule and calling for President Morsi's ousting (or for early elections) claim to lead a second revolution. On the other hand, those supporting the president and the Brotherhood are accusing his detractors of crying foul and mounting a counterrevolution. The West, worried about the sovereignty and security of the state of Israel, has extended support for the military intervention that overthrew the Muslim Brotherhood’s government, widely viewed as conservative and anti-Israel. The survival of America’s most important ally in the region, Israel, is at stake, and the United States is going to exhort all their support in favor of the Egyptian military, which is the major recipient of $1.5 billion per annum of support from America. A strong ally of the United States, Saudi Arabia, is seen to be falling in line with American policy in supporting the military regime and possibly a religious democratic government in Egypt, which would be viewed as a direct threat to Saudi Arabia’s monarchical order. Apart from continuing its previous demands that Israel signs the NPT, Egypt will probably exert intense political and diplomatic pressure on Israel to permit the creation of an independent Palestinian state along the pre-1967 lines, with East Jerusalem as its capital. On this issue, Egypt will certainly be backed or supported by most Arab Muslim states, as well as obtaining close cooperation with Turkey. Indeed, within the newly emerging regional strategic axis between Ankara and Cairo, the Israeli-Palestinian issue will gain priority, alongside the Syrian crisis and the Iranian threat. Although both Turkey and Egypt maintain cold diplomatic relations with Israel, they can help broker a political settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, including Hamas, owing to their close relations with both Palestinian factions. Over the years, Iran has secured a strong footing in the region. Because, for political, economic, cultural, religious, and military reasons, Iran is too important to be treated lightly by any state in the Middle East or Asia. In the complex domestic power structure of Iran, the broader governing polity shares Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s robust conviction that Iran is the linchpin of a wide region and can maintain firm independent positions. Ironically, the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan have supported Iranian ambitions and furthered their agenda in the region. The Sunni Arab states of Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf are wary of Iran yet feel compelled by its strength to maintain largely cordial relations. The relationship between Iran and Turkey pivots between friendship and rivalry, but Turkey favors good relations and the avoidance of further regional instability. Russia is a significant economic partner to Iran, is heavily involved in its nuclear program, and tends to take the role of mediator at the international level. Despite disagreements over Iran's nuclear program, Iranian concerns about Saudi aid to the Taliban in Afghanistan, and Saudi concerns about Iran's efforts to sow discord among the Saudi Shia community, relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia have improved significantly.Pakistan and Iran have a number of areas of mutual interest, such as fighting the drug trade and defeating tribal insurgency along their common borders, as well as prospects for trade and energy. Iran and India have notably improved ties, mostly on the basis of Indian energy needs. Energy security and economic ties also dominate Iran’s dealings with China and Japan. Syria and Iran maintain close relations, as seen clearly in their alliance against the US and Israel and their support for Hezbollah. But due to the civil war in Syria, Iran’s fate in the country is linked with the survival of the Assad regime. Iran’s relationship with Lebanon is long and complicated. The clash between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006 may partly be seen in the backdrop of the broader conflict between Iran and the US/Israel. Israel considers Iran the greatest threat to its security, and the tensions between the two have increased. Now Israel seeks US assistance to attack Iran, claiming it to be a threat. While the US also considers Iran a threat, it seems unlikely that Obama will support Israel in attacking Iran. Additionally, the revelation that Iranian-born close friend of President Obama, Valerie Jarrett, has been taking the lead in "the undercover talks" with Iran proves that the US favors talks rather than confrontation with Iran. Add to that the tangled aftermath of the Arab Spring.The Arab Spring today, in some ways, has become an amalgamation of two phenomena. One is absolute political rebar gaining the social contract in virtually every Arab country, affecting the domestic political balance of power. In addition to that, there has been a total re-negotiation of the strategic balance of power in the region because of the happenings in Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, and so on. The two evidently interact. Changes at the domestic level in Egypt, Syria, and other countries are affecting the balance of power strategically in the region because of the changes in regimes and outlooks that change entails. On the other hand, the struggle in the regional arena is affecting how countries are positioning themselves in the domestic competition for power. For example, in Syria, Iran and Hezbollah are supporting the regime, while the West and Turkey are favoring the opposition. In the current Egyptian crisis, Turkey, favoring the Morsi and goodwill government, and the West provide hidden support to the military and the opposition’s agenda. It is the interplay of the regional strategic and domestic political calculus that makes it even more challenging and complex for foreign countries to react without ambivalence. These complexities and challenges carry implications for Pakistan that are discussed in the following section.
Implications for Pakistan
Looking at the emerging Middle East's regional calculations, the following five points are noteworthy with regard to Pakistan: Israel's continued repression and occupation of Palestine appear to be ongoing for the foreseeable future. This, due to close Indian and Israeli collaboration, also impacts the Indian occupation of Kashmir, an issue very close to heart for Pakistan. The crisis in Iraq due to the US invasion has spiraled into sectarian strife and civil war in the country. In addition to that, foreign intervention in Syria could further exacerbate the sectarian crisis that may spill over into Pakistan. US policies and intervention in both Iraq and Afghanistan have not only disturbed the respective countries, but Pakistan has also, directly and indirectly, suffered in terms of both blood and treasure in the so-called War on Terror. There is also the looming crisis in Iran over its nuclear program that threatens to escalate into a military confrontation in Pakistan’s neighborhood. This conflict carries the potential for the escalation of sectarian conflict within Pakistan. More than three million Pakistanis live in Middle Eastern countries. These countries are providing jobs to millions of Pakistani citizens. A large number of Pakistan’s remittances come from the Middle East. Therefore, for Pakistan’s stability and prosperity, the Middle Eastern region must remain stable. In the present geostrategic environment in the region, although Pakistan enjoys cordial relations with Iran, Turkey, and Egypt, Iran’s relations with the US, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf countries are quite tense due to their perception of its nuclear program and its perceived role in the ongoing situation in Syria. The situation has been further compounded by the US and EU countries' sanctions against Iran due to its nuclear program. This has also put the project of laying a gas pipeline from Iran to Pakistan under strain. In any case, Pakistan has to walk very pragmatically since it cannot lose the friendship of Saudi Arabia and GCC countries with Iran and vice versa. At the same time, Pakistan cannot afford a hostile relationship with the US, which is the sole superpower. The prevailing tensions between Iran, GCC countries, and the US are likely to remain for quite some time in the future. Hence, in the next few years, it will be very challenging for Pakistan to further advance its relations with Iran while also keeping good relations with Saudi Arabia, other GCC countries, and the US, unless some dramatic favorable development occurs.
Conclusion
To conclude, the Middle East once again is in a period of uncertainty. Given Iran’s significant weight and influence in the broader Middle East, developments in that country will cast a shadow over everything else. However, for a wave of long-term peace in the region, the Palestine issue needs to be resolved. Unfortunately, the US, Iran, and Israel continue to display a bunker mentality in which zero-sum-game calculations prevail on the issues of Palestine and the Iranian nuclear program. It is striking that in the Middle East today, hopes for peace are still held hostage to a regional order characterized by the rivalries of postcolonial states, as opposed to postmodern ones. As long as regional politics remains the monopoly of these states, whose behaviors are defined by the "otherness" of their neighbors, contentious rivalries will remain the modus operandi of the Middle East, to the detriment of everyone. A positive aspect, however, can be seen with the emergence of Turkey and Egypt as regional players in the region. Again, it will depend on whether all the players adopt the policy of cooperation or confrontation. By the end of the day, the choices of regional players will save or doom the region.
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